Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.
Søren Kierkegaard, 1844
As most historically significant events, the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daugher in 2018, is defined as much by the post-factum analysis of it, as by the event itself. Those constructing their own narratives after the event are participating in the event as they are reassembling it. The event is multiplicitous in its nature; each interpretation of it “situates the one who proposes the [interpretation] as an heir, as belonging to the future whose creation the event contributed to” (Stengers 2000:67-8). The event is created and transformed through the way it is investigated and publicised, rather than through the way it ‘happens’ (Ingram 2019:170).
Due to the covert nature of this event, one of its most important characteristics is shifted temporality. The event became a subject of public discourse long after it ‘happened’, as it was recontextualised by the media, government, investigation agencies and other actors. The concrete timestamps of the event that one can observe on Wikipedia today were reconstructed long after the event. Being reconstructed by the actors, the event is stretched out in time and space and put into a network of other events. This event creates its own terms of temporality and spatiality (Buchanan & Lambert 2005); moreover, each interpretation of the event creates a unique amalgamation of spatial and temporal terms, thus giving birth to distinct events, emergent out of the original one.
This essay shall argue that there are three main ‘events’, three alternative realities that were ‘enacted’ after the poisoning. First, it is the reality of the British government, the narrative in which the Russian government ordered the assassination. Second, the reality of the Russian government, multiplicitous within itself, where the assassination was ordered by x and the only thing that matters is that x ≠ Russian government. Finally, there is the reality of specialist technical investigation that Ingram states constitutes the event as we perceive it (Ingram 2019).
The three events emerge from two types of recontextualization - reassembling and political situation. The event as seen by Bellingcat is reassembled from pieces of evidence, investigation, open databases and other sources. This way the event is reconstructed, and ‘enacted’ (ibid.). The event as seen by the British and Russian governments is recontextualised through the political situation - there, the nature of the event is determined more by the larger circumstances and dynamics not apparent to the public. Despite the fact that it is intuitive these three realities would interact, I shall argue that they largely do not. The actors who create the realities interact, but the realities that they enact remain on the whole unchanged, despite the interaction of the actors.
Image: Bellingcat/Getty/Guardian Design
The poisoning
Sergei Skripal is a former colonel of Russian military intelligence, who worked as a double agent at the turn of the century, leaking classified information to British intelligence. He was arrested on charges of espionage in 2006, but was transferred to the UK five years later, during a prisoner exchange. On the 3rd of March 2018 Sergei and his daughter Yulia were hospitalised in Salisbury, UK. Soon, the doctors identified the source of their illness - a military grade nerve agent named ‘Novichok’, first created in the Soviet Union in the 70s. The British government, supported by the US and the European Union, immediately accused the Russian government, expelled Russian diplomats and pushed for sanctions against the country (BBC News 14/03/2018). The Russian government denied the allegations and produced a number of alternative theories.
Six months later, the Crown Prosecution Service charged two Russian nationals in absentia - Ruslan Boshirov and Alexander Petrov (BBC News 05/09/2018). At that point however, the origins or evidence of complicity of these two men remained unclear. This was until the 26th of September, when the private open-source investigation agency Bellingcat published their report on the identity of Ruslan Boshirov - or, as they identified him, GRU Colonel Anatoliy Chepiga (Bellingcat 26/09/2018). Nine days later, Bellingcat identified ‘Alexander Petrov’ as Dr. Alexander Mishkin, Hero of Russia (Bellingcat 06/10/2018). The two suspects were identified using Russian citizen databases, and the methodology of the investigators was published as well. Bellingcat removed any reasonable doubt about Russian state complicity, yet by the point of its release the controversy was all but over.
The poisoning of Skripals can be seen as branching out. Starting as a singularity, completely unseen to parties who would later become key actors, the event conventionally ‘happened’ on the 3rd of March, when Sergei and Yulia Skripal were hospitalised. The main ‘Poisoning’ chapter on Wikipedia begins with Yulia’s arrival in Moscow and ends when the police find the vial with Novichok nerve agent used for the poisoning. What is essential, the much longer ‘Investigation’ chapter goes both forwards and backwards in time. As the investigation progresses, the investigators could delve deeper and deeper into the past, the pre-event event. The temporal shift of the event into the past and future is parallel but moves in opposite directions at different speeds.
Further, the event develops not only temporally, but also spatially. Starting in Salisbury, the event moves all around the world. Statements are issued in the UK Parliament in the centre of London, the steps of suspects are traced through Switzerland and Russia, tweets by the Russian Embassy and investigation conclusions emerge from the nether realm of the internet. Having ‘happened’ in one place at one time, the poisoning launched into different directions in time and space; or expanded from a ‘focal point’ (Ingram 2019:171).
Reassembling the event
The ‘reassembled event’ emerged from many sources, guided by a trail of evidence. The same way the investigators were following the radioactive trail of polonium during the Litvinenko case (Ingram 2019:175), investigators of the Skripal case were following the digital footprint of the assassins. The breakthrough came when two suspects were identified using surveillance footage (BBC News 05/09/2018). Their flight from Moscow to London, hotel bills, two trips to Salisbury, walking towards the house of the Skripals and then their trip back to Russia were thoroughly recorded (ibid.). A few days later, Russian investigators contacted the original designers of the Novichok nerve agent and stated it originated in Russia (Novaya Gazeta 23/03/2018). As time went on, the investigators ventured further and further into the past.
However, there was a key difference between the ways Skripal and Litvinenko cases were reassembled. In the case of Litvinenko, the puzzle was to put the scarce pieces of evidence together. To locate and put in sequence the traces of polonium, to create a full picture in circumstances of scarce data. In the case of Skripal, the challenge was to find the relevant parts in a vast amount of data. Bellingcat delved into leaked Russian databases, narrowing down the identity of the two suspects named by the Crown Prosecution Service (Bellingcat 26/09/2018). Using reverse image searching and cold calling Russian agencies, the investigators managed to identify the two suspects as intelligence officers of the G.U. (formerly known as GRU).
Over the first six months after the attempted assassination, the picture gradually became clearer. With the effort of the Crown Prosecution Service, Novaya Gazeta, Bellingcat and others, more and more details became revealed and the event was ‘reassembled’ and ‘enacted’. It is interesting to note the stark difference between contributors to the picture - the official Crown Prosecution Service, releasing scarce details and keeping their methodology mostly secret; Bellingcat, describing in comprehensive detail their entire investigation. In the case of Skripal, the process of reassembling took hundreds of very diverse sources. The information freely travelled between these sources, and the global picture was assembled from the best evidence from each source. As will be shown in the next part, the global pictures emergent from the Russian and British positions were informed neither by the investigation nor by each other.
Political situation
Whilst it took six months for Bellingcat to release conclusive evidence of the complicity of the Russian state, the perspectives of the British and Russian governments emerged mere days after the poisoning. These two branches of interpretation immediately engaged in dialogue, but remained unaffected by each other. The shape of their responses varied in relation to the response of the counterpart, yet the nature of the perspective remained the same. The perspectives were shaped by the political situation, as opposed to evidence as it was with Bellingcat and the Crown Prosecution service. The event, as constructed by the British government, was guided by the wider political frame, Russian history of state sponsored assassinations and the need to act in the immediate aftermath of the poisoning, without waiting for the inquiry. The frame of political situation points at “dynamics that are not apparent in public but which are nonetheless critical to the evolution of the public knowledge controversy” (Barry 2013:11).
Figure 1: tweet from the Russian Embassy in response to May’s ultimatum
Theresa May issued a statement just 10 days after the attack, stating that it is “highly likely” that the Russian government is behind the poisoning (BBC News 13/03/2018). She issued an ultimatum to the Russian government demanding an explanation for how the nerve agent ended up being used on UK soil. At that point the poison had been identified as one invented in the Soviet Union, but no other evidence was available and no statement had been issued by the investigators. The interpretation of the British government immediately started dictating the international discourse in the US and European Union (Vonberg 15/03/2018). In the days following May’s statement, President Trump and EU officials also accused Russia, and on the 26th of March 33 Russian diplomats were expelled from EU countries (BBC News 26/03/2018). Sanctions followed soon. The UK government quickly constructed the event, despite the lack of conclusive evidence of Russia’s involvement.
The Russian government ignored the ultimatum issued by May and instead launched a campaign of the (in)famous sarcastic responses on twitter (see Figures 1 and 2) and amplifying (or, according to some, even creating (Haynes 24/03/2018)) conspiracy theories emerging from the internet. Literal transliteration of May’s “highly likely” written in Cyrillic (‘хайли лайкли’) quickly became a meme, synonymous with incompetence and malice - the traits that May’s government became associated with in the Russian public discourse. The Russian government vehemently denied any involvement in the poisoning and demanded to be included in the investigation process. Similarly to the UK, such statements were issued long before any conclusive statements from the investigation teams. Russia constructed a narrative in which someone else is to blame, public discourse of Moscow as a ‘besieged fortress’ was reinforced and a response to sanctions seemed justified.
Whilst the British interpretation is linear, the Russian perspective has branches of its own. The British government presented a narrative in which Russia was behind the assassination attempt. The Russian government could not simply deny that fact - there was a need for an alternative narrative. For instance, it was theorized that British intelligence was complicit in the poisoning, given the proximity of Salisbury to the British military research facility Porton Down (BBC News Russia 23/03/2018). Another theory that appeared on the Russian Internet was that Yulia Skripal’s would-be mother-in-law was the poisoner (MK 14/03/2018). A multitude of parties were pointed at, including the US, Russian oligarchs and rogue agents. How exactly any of those parties would have obtained a Russian military grade nerve agent remained unclear, but that fact was also irrelevant. Any new theory that implicated a new party in the poisoning exonerated the Russian government and thus served its purpose.
Serving the government’s purpose was absolutely critical for both the Russian and the British interpretation of the event. As mentioned earlier, the British government took action long before any conclusive evidence was presented by the investigators, and the same can be said about the Russian version. This clearly demonstrates the ‘non-interactive interaction’ of the two versions of the event. The two perspectives responded to each other, as evidenced from figures 1 and 2, but at the same time their constructions of the event remained unchanged (or, in the case of Russia, constantly morphing).
Figure 2: tweet from the Russian Embassy in the UK one day after May’s statement
One of the key differences between constructing the event from the perspectives of political situation and reassembling is the reactive-proactive dichotomy. Both are clearly reactive at the core, as they are recontextualising the event in the immediate aftermath and in reaction to it. However, the goals of the two approaches differ. Whilst Bellingcat conducted their investigation in order to clarify the event, the British and Russian government did so pursuing their own agenda - to shape public discourse, to authorise sanctions, to solidify personal standings within the government and many others. This leads to a contradiction. The agenda of investigation agencies is reactive - they seek to unravel, reassemble and ‘enact’ the event as closely to the truth as possible. They are naturally incentivised to be ‘accurate’ and make claims only substantiated by evidence. Government agenda is proactive, the goal is to shape future events, rather than to accurately depict past events. As a result, their recontextualisation of the event is more effective at shaping public discourse as well as international relations, but does not directly rely on evidence.
It has to be noted that due to the nature of the ‘political situation’, it is possible that state actors in the Skripal case construct the event from the point of dynamics not apparent to the public. Nevertheless, this contradiction is clear from the lack of interaction between state agents and investigative agencies. Most government statements were issued in the immediate aftermath of the poisoning, and Bellingcat releases in September received very little response. When asked to comment on the Bellingcat investigation the press-secretary of the Russian Embassy to the UK responded questioning the character of the agency, as opposed to the nature of their investigation (Rusemb 09/10/2018). This closely resembles the character attacks that followed May’s statement in March (Figures 1 and 2). There was interaction between the actors, but that interaction did not affect the constructed versions of the event. In the case of Bellingcat, the UK government did not even issue a statement. By the time the event was reassembled by the investigators, the two ‘political situation perspectives’ had already taken root.
The three ‘enactments’ of the Skripal poisoning present three radically different approaches to recontextualisation of the event. They all pursued different goals, utilised different strategies and worked with different terms of time and space. As a result, unsurprisingly, they came to different conclusions, with varying level of detail and certainty. The biggest fault line between these three constructions is in the opposition in goals - the proactive-reactive dichotomy. It is expressed in their methods as an opposition between reassembling and political situation in approaching geopolitical events. Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the three ‘enactments’ is how disconnected they are. The parties that constructed these perspectives do interact, but the events they construct remain untouched. The interpretation of the event creates three distinct realities.
Andrey X, 2019
Academic Bibliography
Barry, A. (2013). Material politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline. 1st ed.
Buchanan, I. and Lambert, G. eds. (2005). Deleuze and Space. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1980). A thousand plateaus. Berkeley, CA: Venus Pencils.
Ingram, A. (2019). Thinking security through the event: Materiality, politics and publicity in the Litvinenko affair. Security Dialogue, 50(2), pp.165-180.
Stengers I. (2000) The Invention of Modern Science, trans. Daniel W. Smith, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
Toal, G. (2019). Near Abroad. [S.l.]: OXFORD UNIV PRESS US.
Supporting Material
BBC News (13 March 2018) Russian spy: Highly likely Moscow behind attack, says Theresa May
BBC News (14 March 2018) "UK to expel 23 Russian diplomats"
BBC News (26 March 2018) “Spy poisoning: Russian diplomats expelled across US and Europe”
BBC News (5 September 2018) "Salisbury Novichok poisoning: Two Russian nationals named as suspects".
BBC News Russia (23 March 2018) Глава Портон-Дауна: утечки "Новичка" из британской лаборатории быть не могло
Bellingcat (September 26, 2018) Skripal Suspect Boshirov Identified as GRU Colonel Anatoliy Chepiga
Bellingcat (October 9, 2018) Full report: Skripal Poisoning Suspect Dr. Alexander Mishkin, Hero of Russia
Haynes D. (24 March 2018) Skripal attack: 2,800 Russian bots ‘sowed confusion after poison attacks’ The Times
MK (14 March 2018) СМИ: Скрипаля отравила несостоявшаяся свекровь Юлии
Rusemb (Russian Embassy to the UK) 09.10.2018 Ответ пресс-секретаря Посольства на вопрос СМИ относительно нового расследования группы «Беллингкэт»
Vonberg, J. (15 March 2018) "Trump: Russia likely poisoned ex-spy, 'based on all the evidence'". CNN.
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